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i) Introduction 
The history of South Africa, like that of any other country, cannot be viewed in isolation. 
Despite its apparently unique political and economic development, important aspects of 
South Africa's twentieth-century history must be placed within the context of broader 
patterns, whether they relate to Africa and the Third World or to western capitalist countries. 
This paper considers one facet of South Africa's political economy, namely, the development 
of health and welfare provisions for African workers down to 1948. [l] The paper analyses 
the extent to which pre-apartheid South Africa followed other countries in creating the 
foundations of a welfare state for its Afr-ican labour force. The central argument is that, in the 
face of a range of pressures, the South African state increased the tempo of health and social 
planning. However, the government's commitment to meaningful provisions was never more 
than lukewarm. It cynically manipulated the more progressive elements within the State to 
give the appearance of action and thus contain unrest during World War II. The immediate 
post-war period saw the government shedding its appearance of commitment to health and 
welfare legislation. The state had overthrown plans for improving the lot of African workers 
even before the National Party took power in 1948 under the banner of apartheid. 
From the 1860s, South Africa's mining economy dragged hundreds of thousands of African 
workers into a world of migrancy, very low wages, extremely harsh working conditions and 
barrack-like living quarters. By the 1920s, a small but growing manufacturing sector was 
taking its place alongside the mining industry. More and more Africans were leaving the 
rural areas and seeking work in the towns. White South Africa tried to retain control of its 
destiny through a policy of segregation - by regulating mineworkers' movements, applying 
influx controls to urban-dwellers and preserving white supremacy in the political arena. Both 
the National Party under J B M Hertzog (Prime Minister, 1924-39) and the South African 
Party under Jan Smuts (Prime Minister 1919-24, 1939-48) shared these basic goals. The 
unification of the parties from 1934 to 1939 underlined this. In the administrative sphere, the 
state's front line was the Native Affairs Department (NAD), which oversaw the application 
of segregationist legislation. The system became more difficult to maintain as 
industrialization and urbanization picked up pace through the later 1930s and the 1940s and 
as the state itself became increasingly complex. Nowhere were these problems more apparent 
than in the field of health and welfare provision: the Public Health Act (1919) and the 
founding of the Labour Department (1924) and the Social Welfare Department (1937) 
impinged heavily on the notion of segregated administration. 
From the mid-1930s, groups ranging from Afrikaans nationalist organizations to African 
trade unions pressed the government with demands for social welfare. Within state structures, 
the Department of Labour, the Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission, 
National Housing and Planning Commission, Social and Economic Planning Commission 
(SEPC), Social Services Commission and National Health Services Commission, 
recommended a social security system fit for a prosperous, post-war, industrial economy. 
World War I1 also brought greater contact with Britain and the United States, where state 
intervention and social planning were already well established. The impact of these factors 
on Smuts's wartime coalition government (1939-48) can be seen in several areas. This paper 
covers housing, pensions and unemployment insurance in section (ii) and hospitals and 
medical services in section (iii). Two points are stressed: changes over time in the state's 
approach to health and welfare generally for black workers; and the ways in which different 
parts of the State appropriated aspects of the question and impacted on the overall 
development of social services before 1948. [2] 
ii) "Outdoor Relief" for the Urban African Proletariat 
In the 1930s and 1940s, South Africa took the first faltering steps towards a "welfare state". 
There were several external pressures on the government to introduce welfare legislation. 
From the mid-1930s, white liberals drew public attention to the maltreatment of African 
workers under existing legislation. Those involved in this effort were members of the 
Institute of Race Relations and, from 1936, the Natives Representative Council and MPS 
elected by Africans. [3] ,Proponents of welfare laws could count on support from key civil 
servants, including Ivan Walker, the Secretary for Labour (1932-45), Public Health 
Department officials such as Peter Allan (who had conducted the first survey of the spread of 
TB in rural areas in the 1920s), Harry Gear and George Gale, and Douglas Srnit, the 
Secretary for Native Affairs from 1934 to 1945. [4] 
A second set of political pressures came from a combination of public concern over 
deprivation amongst white people and the rise of AWaner nationalism. Meetings of the 
Afrikaner Volkskongres, the Report of the Carnegie Commission and the 1936 National 
Congress on Social Work heightened public awareness of the "poor white" problem. [5] The 
extreme right-wing Purified National Party, founded in 1934, mobilized poor Afrikaners 
around the issue of white workers' declining health standards. [6] White South Africans 
generally became concerned about the threat to their health from squalid African living 
conditions in proximity to white urban areas. '"Horrible' Native Townships", the Rand 
Daily Mail proclaimed in 1935: "Hovels and mangy dogs: plague spots that must be cleared 
up." [7] The emphasis here was on the plague aspect - besides being an outrage to the 
conscience, the spread of slum conditions, malnutrition and disease amongst blacks was a 
"positive danger to the community" which required official remedial action. Although the 
State accepted that health services were required in both the rural and urban contexts, the 
forms of "outdoor relief' discussed in this section - pensions, unemployment benefits and 
subsidized housing - were primarily aimed at the urban-dwelling, proletarianized population. 
All branches of the State agreed that mine employees were well enough cared for under 
existing provisions, whereas white farmers were considered too poor to contribute to such 
schemes for their workers. Faced with these sorts of pressures, the Government took action 
where opposition nationalists most demanded it; socially, it treated the symptoms where they 
impinged on white sensitivities and quality of life. [8] 
World War II brought further economic, political and social impulses which focused official 
attention on welfare provisions. Boom conditions in primary and secondary industry made 
the national economy more able to shoulder the cost of welfare legislation. Black and white 
trade unions increased their bargaining power as manufacturing activity mushroomed and the 
armed services drew manpower away from industrial production. Workers themselves turned 
militant as inflation and overcrowding worsened their quality of life while employers reaped 
the benefits of a sheltered domestic market. The government, meanwhile, was eager to avoid 
major confrontations during the war. Senior cabinet ministers publicly admitted the need to 
improve conditions for workers of all races. 
None of these elements would have shifted the state towards broader efforts at social 
planning, had it not been for the example of events overseas. The American president, 
F D Roosevelt, introduced the Social Security Act in 1935; in doing so, he was consciously 
following legislation in Germany, Denmark and Austria. [g] Even more important for South 
Africa was wartime planning in Britain, especially by the Beveridge Commission on Social 
Services, which reported in 1942. As the British social scientist Victor George put it, 
There is no doubt that the promised improvements in social 
services were seen by the government as part of the strategy of 
winning the war; it was felt that such improvements, in the 
words of Galbraith referring to the American situation, 'would 
reassure those who were fighting as to their eventual utility as 
citizens'. [l01 
The Smuts government was just as eager to reassure its citizens that they were fighting for a 
better future. Following the British example, it appointed wartime commissions to formulate 
health and welfare schemes. These were supposed to ensure a better quality of life for all. No 
matter that the State could not immediately effect the plans; the important thing was to keep 
people's minds concentrated on the post-war era, when a much expanded economy and 
welfare-minded government would deliver all things to all people. The government naturally 
enlisted the assistance and expertise of its civil servants; officials in the Labour, Public 
Health, Social Welfare, and Native Affairs Departments helped to draw up plans in all the 
aforementioned areas. 
From the start, state officials were anxious to portray their efforts as a meaningful 
contribution to living standards. The Departments of Public Health and Labour, which 
administered housing and unemployment benefit legislation, respectively, were themselves 
products of a "changing pattern of society", their purported function being to "improve 
economic and social conditions". Like the Social Welfare Department, they claimed to 
promote these ends on a colour-blind basis. The NAD could hardly make similar claims; 
instead, its officials manipulated (and, to a certain extent, were manipulated by) a different 
legitimating ethos based on trusteeship and protection. The degree to which officials in each 
department stuck to these lofty principles was displayed in the evolution and application of 
social welfare laws. 
The widespread influenza epidemic which hit South Africa in 1918 was a powerful stimulus 
behind the Public Health Act (1919). However, the Public Health Department which it 
described had very limited powers and financial resources. Its chief purpose was to give 
advice to other authorities and private employers. Although the act made no specific 
reference to race, the fact that the bulk of health provisions were to be applied by local and 
provincial authorities, rather than by the central state, meant that the department lacked the 
powers to enforce equal health care for all the races. In any case, as a memorandum from 
1921 suggests, Public Health officials were not thinking in terms of equality. For sure, 
"equity and justice towards the natives themselves" were important; but the real reason for 
taking action on such issues as housing for blacks was to protect the white population against 
"native discontent ... and the carriage of disease from natives to whites". [l l ]  
J A Mitchell, the Secretary for Public Health from 1919 to 1932, was unusually well 
acquainted with the miserable social conditions prevailing in Cape Town's African 
locations. [l21 Yet, despite this awareness, neither the will nor the money was available for 
the Public Health Department to launch large-scale housing schemes for Africans or to 
enforce decent standards of planning, construction, hygiene and sanitation. The Housing Act 
of 1920 established a Central Housing Board under the department's aegis to provide 
government loans for approved schemes. But it was left to local authorities to decide 
whether to take up the loans and the Government offered the money at market rates. By the 
end of 1930, only 7,609 dwellings had been built for Africans and coloureds with Central 
Housing Board loans. A large proportion of those were single rooms in barracks, while many 
of the actual houses had only two rooms. [l31 From 1930, the Government approved sub- 
economic housing loans for the "poorer classes" but excluded Africans until 1934. From that 
year, municipalities could build location housing using state funds at 2 per cent interest (in 
1936, the interest was reduced to 0.75 per cent). Local authorities still held the sole 
discretion to initiate loans. Central state bureaucrats were aware that municipalities were not 
taking advantage of the scheme; Mitchell's successor as Secretary for Public Health, Sir 
Edward Thornton, sat on the 1935 commission which found that Johannesburg had been 
clearing slums under the 1934 Slums Act without building sufficient new housing in the 
locations. [l41 But the Department of Public Health preferred not to interfere: as Thornton 
informed the Cape Eastern Public Bodies in 1936: 
It is not considered possible for the department to obtain 
parliamentary sanction for the making of further grants to local 
authorities. [l51 
By 1939, the State had approved £3,750,823 in sub-economic loans "to assist low-paid 
workers in receipt of wages too small to permit of their participating" under the economic 
housing scheme. Again, this figure was an aggregate for black and coloured people. The 
government lent a total of £5,445,100 from the sub-economic fund, which stood at E13m. 
Local authorities had built nearly 13,000 dwellings for "non-Europeans" under the sub- 
economic scheme and 10,000 under the economic scheme. [l61 
It was not until the Second World War that the state began to treat the shortage of affordable 
housing seriously. The situation by this time was acute. Whereas the 1920 Housing 
Committee estimated a shortfall of 10,000 houses, the 1936 Public Health Department Report 
put the figure at 16,000 in the eight largest cities alone. By 1942, accelerated urbanization 
had made things even worse. The Smit Committee found "large numbers" of Africans living 
in makeshift dwellings. The shacks were insanitary and overcrowded, with no foundations 
and protection against damp, and overrun by vermin. [l71 Even in housing provided by local 
authorities, there was overcrowding in "most, if not all" dwellings because high rents forced 
tenants to take in lodgers and relatives. Overcrowding was a prime factor in the spread of 
infectious diseases such as tuberculosis. The lack of washing facilities, latrines or refuse- 
disposal services compounded this problem. [l81 
The Thornton Committee on Peri-Urban Areas (1938-39) and the Smit Committee (1942) 
gave officials the opportunity to voice their dissatisfaction. [l91 The Smit Report called for 
the accelerated development of housing schemes. It proposed that municipalities should 
make up the losses from their General Revenues and not solely from their Native Revenue 
Accounts. A further spur for the government came from squatting movements which sprang 
up around Johannesburg during the war. In 1944, the Housing Amendment Act abolished the 
Central Housing Board and set up the National Housing and Planning Commission. The 
Housing (Emergency Powers) Act of 1945 allowed the central state to take the initiative by 
undertaking housing schemes and recouping the costs from local authorities. [20] In the 
process, the state came to see low-cost housing not just as an aspect of public health or as a 
means to control the urban proletariat, but also as part of the wider task of social welfare 
provision. It was no longer just a question of providing the minimum safety net: the 
government was now supposed to be thinking on the grand scale, planning for after the war 
when workers of all races would not accept the poor deal they had had to put up with for so 
long. As a 1944 House of Assembly resolution stated: 
This House requests the Government to consider the 
advisability of introducing a comprehensive programme of 
legislation and administrative measures embracing the subjects 
of the provision of employment, social security, housing and 
public health, nutrition and education, such programme to 
constitute the people's charter as the outcome of the war. [21] 
The National Housing and Planning Council speeded up the rate of building at sub-economic 
rates. In 1947, the Commission financed 10,355 "assisted" dwellings at a cost of £4,667,531. 
Yet the attitudes which prevailed in the various departments and the extent of the state's 
commitment as measured against the size of the problem were still markedly different. [22] 
In effect, the Committee - which also included senior members of the Public Health and 
Social Welfare Departments - saw welfare work primarily in terms of limiting unrest. The 
Public Health Department's own reports for 1946-48 show that officials still preferred to pass 
responsibility to the municipalities, despite the state's new powers.[23] The government 
itself soon flinched at the size of the crisis: it imposed limits on losses under assisted schemes 
and left the National Housing and Planning Commission doubting whether it would be 
granted the necessary funding. There were signs that the Treasury would make further funds 
available in the last few months of the Smuts era; but the Smuts government bequeathed a 
huge and worsening problem to the incoming National Party. [24] 
Government-sponsored investigations into post-war social welfare provision also promoted 
benefits for Africans such as pensions and unemployment payments. The impetus came in 
part from the Social and Economic Planning Council, set up in 1942 as a semi-official 
advisory body reporting to the Prime Minister. The SEPC embraced social security as one of 
its basic "guiding principles" and sought to advance schemes which were within the 
bbproductive capacity" of the country. [25] The Council secured the appointment of a Social 
Security Committee in 1943, including several senior civil servants - P Allan (Secretary for 
Public Health), G A C Kuschke (Secretary for Social Welfare), W J G Mears (Under 
Secretary for Native Affairs) and I L Walker (Sec re t .  for Labour). When it reported the 
following year, the committee advocated a full programme of pensions, and health and 
unemployment insurance. [26] This was to be the "Welfare State" in no uncertain terms, 
providing minimum subsistence standards for all contributors plus a system of smaller 
benefits for Africans in the reserves. Having already accepted the need for social security, the 
government could not lightly dismiss this report. Instead, Smuts shifted S F Waterson from 
Commerce and Industry to the new position of Minister of Economic Development. [27] As 
Chairman of both the Inter-departmental Committee on Social Security and the Select 
Committee on Social Security, Waterson whittled down the rates set by the 1943 Social 
Security Committee. The government's White Paper on Social Security backed him up in 
1945 by proposing to restrict state expenditure on pensions, contributory schemes and other 
allowances. [28] 
The actual laws passed in the war years were even smaller in scope. The Pensions Laws 
Amendment Act of 1944 which brought Africans under pension legislation for the first time 
established three levels of £21, £9 and £6 per annum, depending on whether the recipient 
lived in a city, town or rural area. [29] Prospective pensioners were subject to means tests of 
£18, £13.10~. and £9, respectively. By the end of 1946, Native Commissioners operating on 
behalf of the Pensions Commissioner were doling out 140,000 pensions. The NAD estimated 
the eventual number of participants at 367,000 with an anticipated annual expenditure of 
£2,336,000. [30] The scheme provided for blind people at the same rates. The Secretary for 
Native Affairs could issue grants for invalids at his own discretion (the anticipated 
expenditure being £781,000) and could make poor relief grants in exceptional cases. This 
might involve local relief of famine, drought or epidemics. The department could fund 
feeding schemes for pre-school children and short-term work projects for the semi-fit. [31] 
The act fell far short of the minimum subsistence envisioned by the SEPC, though it put a 
considerable strain on local NAD officials. Thus, the government's policy of "doing it on the 
cheap" resulted in woefully inadequate payments for people without any other means of 
subsistence and much extra work for the NAD, whose role in welfare administration for 
blacks expanded through the 1940s. 
The Unemployment Insurance Act of 1946 was a direct product of the 1944 Social Security 
Committee Report and the 1945 White Paper on Social Security. [32] The original statute of 
1937 permitted the establishment of unemployment benefit funds by employers and unions in 
certain scheduled industries. The law kept the number of Africans affected to a minimum by 
excluding labourers who came under the Native Labour Regulation Act (1911) or who 
earned less than £78 per annum.[33] The government claimed the new act would cover about 
700,000 workers under a central Unemployment Insurance Fund; the lowest-paid would 
contribute 3d. a week while the state and employer put in 9d. each. The smallest benefits 
would be about £5 per month which, the government foresaw, "should not be so high as to 
affect the stimulus to work". [34] 
The 1945 White Paper deliberately left vague which classes of employee would come under 
the act. From late 1945 until Parliament passed the Unemployment Insurance Act in 1946, 
this provoked conflict between the Departments of Labour, Mines and Native Affairs, the 
Native Affairs Commission, the Natives Representative Council and the Chamber of Mines. 
The confrontation began when the mineowners realized the Government's proposals would 
include South African miners and others not subject to compulsory repatriation. The thought 
of paying nine pence a week for some 200,000 labourers horrified the mineowners, who used 
every argument they could think of to excuse themselves. [35] J E Barry, for the mines, 
claimed in March 1946 that workers would resent the statutory deductions; their fixed 
contracts would mean they would never benefit from the scheme; the Social Security 
Committee had only supported contributions for urban-dwellers; the plan would encourage 
ex-mineworkers to swell the ranks of the urban unemployed; and the levy would have nasty 
repercussions on the mines' working costs and therefore on the national economy. [36] 
The Chamber of Mines enjoyed full support from the Department of Mines, then under the 
ministerial guidance of Colonel Stallard. [37] The Secretary for Native Affairs from 1945, 
W J G Mears, provided further backing: the scheme would be impossible to administer, 
owing to impersonations and the difficulty of making migrants from remote areas appear 
before claims officers. Mears argued that mineworkers who stayed on in the towns and found 
other employment would be brought under the act anyway. Although he couched his 
language in administrative terms, his underlying concern may well have been to preserve the 
migrant labour system which his department oversaw and which would have been 
undermined if ex-mineworkers could remain in the towns and look for work. The scheme 
would also have interfered with the Government's commitment to influx control, reasserted 
in the 1945 Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act. [38] The Secretary for Native Affairs 
eventually accepted a compromise - that the mines should be spared from paying 
contributions for migrants whose return fares were provided by the employer. This would 
force a real monetary concession from the mines (in the form of the return fare) while also 
bolstering the long-term future of the migrant labour system and discouraging thc drift to the 
towns and all its contingent social problems. 1391 
The mineowners' chief opponent was the Secretary for Labour, F L A Buchanan. Like the 
Chamber and the NAD, he put his case in practical and economic terms. On the first count, 
there was no reason to exclude a large and wealthy group of employers like the mines who 
would be hit no harder than any other business. For administrators, it was very hard to 
distinguish between "tribal" and "urban" Africans, as many migrants already drifted between 
the towns, mines and rural areas. The scheme would provide real coverage for the 
unemployed; it could not be made economical unless the "good risk paid for the bad". The 
Labour Department also emphasised the reaction from overseas: the International Labour 
Organisation would not ratify the act unless it included the mining sector. If the Chamber of 
Mines was really worried about the negative effects of contributions on mineworkers' 
mentality, Buchanan added, they could always pay the employees' share themselves. [40] 
The Department of Labour needed the mining industry's financial support in order to make 
the new law work. Labour officials were unlikely to worry if it later proved that African 
miners could not get a return on their threepence a day. However, the Government came 
down heavily on the side of the mining industry. The 1946 act specifically excluded African 
gold and coal workers who were provided with accommodation and food, along with farm 
labourers, domestic servants, Africans employed in rural areas (but not in factories), and 
casual labourers. [4 l] 
The government thus reduced the potential threat from African unemployment in the towns 
where the problem would be most visible and where workers were more proletarianized and 
better organized. It also dealt with it at a time when business was booming, before any 
peacetime slump could swell the ranks of the jobless. Given the government's waning 
support among whites in the mid- to late-1940s, its limited moves to provide a social safety 
net for Africans may have been politically foolish. Its measures were not enough to satisfy 
critics on the left, but more than sufficient to provide ammunition for Afrikaner nationalists. 
In taking the steps it did, the state was responding more to long-term planners in South 
Africa and to the example of developments overseas. It envisaged a social welfare 
programme fit for a fully developed, industrial economy, on American or British lines. On 
the other hand, the Government effectively rejected the SEPC's call for "minimum protection 
against want". Rather, it paid heed to the needs of the most important sector in terms of 
revenue and to political fears of alienating white voters through raising taxation or 
demanding contributions from farmers. In unemployment benefit, as in pensions and 
housing, the debate over welfare provisions for the post-war era thus ended in something less 
than half a loaf for the African population. 
The SEPC saw the social welfare debate as a direct result of the war: it "broadened the social 
conscience" and "showed what could be achieved by deliberate organisation". [42] To SEPC 
members, this meant planning by experts - scientific management of resources by people 
without political bias from the academic world, administrators, the representatives of 
business and capital and groups involved in social work. This followed developments in 
Britain, where Beveridge's Interdepartmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied 
Services was already writing the blueprint for Britain's welfare state. [43] Locally, the social 
welfare debate increased in stridency in the 1930s when rapid industrialization and townward 
migration caused unprecedented social problems. Faced with the peculiar exigencies of the 
wartime situation, the Smuts government adopted the language of the international social 
reform movement and gave the impression that much thought was being put into creating a 
better world for all. Founding such bodies as the National Housing and Planning Council, the 
SEPC and the National Health Council allowed the Government to appear committed to 
social welfare while in fact it held back to weigh the political and financial costs. For their 
part, civil servants generally welcomed these initiatives. The occasional repudiation of their 
proposals by a semi-governmental organization, as in the conflict over unemployment 
insurance, was clearly irritating; but the presence of bureaucrats on committees of experts, 
planning for the future without the usual immediate restraints of budget votes and anxious 
political masters, could not have been inimical to their self-esteem. 
Nevertheless, the government had no intention of taking more from all the proposals and 
counter-proposals than it felt was politically necessary or financially expedient. The Smuts 
regime in its last years was not a reforming government, set on implementing a new deal for 
all its citizens. On the contrary, it was a hard-pressed coalition, torn by pressures arising from 
the National Party's growing popularity among Afrikaners. Black working-class poverty and 
unrest were taken seriously in the later 1940s; but, in the eyes of the Government, it was 
easier to contain it with repression and half-measures than to risk a white backlash to the 
introduction of an expensive "welfare state". 
iii) "Mother Wit" versus National Medical Health Services 
Shula Marks tackles the development of health services for Africans in her essay, 
"Industrialization, Rural Health and the 1944 National Health Services Commission in South 
Africa". She describes the effects on health of overcrowding, landlessness, very low wages 
and poor conditions, from the time of the discovery of diamonds in 1867. With the mineral 
revolution, agricultural transformation and industrial growth, came malnutrition and 
infectious diseases. No part of the country was safe. Migrant mineworkers continued to carry 
tuberculosis back to rural areas (though there was a sharp decline in the incidence of TB in 
the mines from the 1920s and again after the introduction of X-rays for all mineworkers in 
the 1940s). As the Native Economic Commission observed in 1932, Africans in the rural 
areas faced a bleak future: "a desolate picture of denudation and erosion" in parts of the 
Ciskei; the spread of weeds, overstocking and erosion in the Transkei; low yields and no 
irrigation in the Free State; "general congestion" of people and cattle in the Transvaal; 
sleeping sickness and malaria in Natal (the latter was alleviated in the 1930s by local malaria 
committees and the Native Affairs and Public Health Departments). [44] Malnutrition was 
common in various parts of the country, causing deficiency diseases and lowering resistance 
to infections. [45] 
Conditions in the towns were no better: municipalities were slow to apply basic regulations 
on sanitation and garbage disposal. Councils insisted on self-balancing Native Revenue 
Accounts and even diverted revenue from Africans for other purposes, instead of making 
money available to improve locations. [46] Infectious diseases spread rapidly in the cramped 
and overcrowded conditions of town life. [47] There were 2,000 doctors in the country in 
1940 for a total population of over 10,000,000. [48] As the Gluckman Commission stressed, 
existing health services did not come close to meeting the needs of either town- or country- 
dwellers. [49] 
Two problems identified by the Gluckman Commission were the "limited conception of 
public health which obtained in 1919" (when the act was passed) and the complex division of 
powers among local, provincial and central authorities. [50] Although Parliament had the 
power to override provincial authorities, the provinces administered general hospitals and 
had overall control of local authorities and pauper relief. Local authorities handled non- 
personal matters such as sanitation, water and hygiene as well as outbreaks of infectious 
diseases. Under the 1919 act, the Union government took charge of district surgeons (who, as 
part-time servants of the State, were supposed to provide for indigent patients) and leper and 
mental hospitals. As the Gluckman Report put it, this still left considerable work for "mother 
wit" in the training of personnel. From the 1920s, though, the Public Health Department 
found itself building hospitals for other communicable diseases, including tuberculosis and 
venereal disease. Local authorities were expected to contribute to their maintenance. By an 
amendment of 1935, the department began to support district nursing services. Two years 
later, following the Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Poor Relief and 
Charitable Institutions, poor relief services (except in Natal) were transferred to the 
Department of Social Welfare. [51] 
Two other laws made more specific reference to African workers. The Native Labour 
Regulation Act (191 1) allowed the Government to issue regulations on medical examinations 
and vaccinations of labourers and their families, the care of the sick or injured and the 
prevention of communicable diseases. [52] The Public Health Department played a role in 
enforcing these regulations. It encouraged large employers to build their own hospitals, laid 
down minimum conditions and occasionally assisted the NAD in investigating allegations of 
maltreatment. [53] The department also supervised medical examinations of African males 
at pass offices in the larger urban centres [54]) However, the examination was perfunctory, 
partly because doctors believed they were inadequately remunerated for their services. In the 
1920s and 1930s, the department repeatedly refused to include women or to introduce further 
periodic tests. [55] Examinations helped to reassure the white public that their towns were 
not awash with disease-carriers but did little to protect African workers' health. 
The fact that health care was split between different authorities and under several laws made 
it at once easier to ignore the lack of provision for Africans and harder to do anything about 
it. The Public Health Department annually published the upward trend in the number of 
hospital beds available to "non-Europeans", showing a steady rise from 12,520 in 1932, to 
23,593 in 1946. [56] But these were total figures, including mine and factory hospitals, 
mission hospitals and private nursing homes as well as provincial and general hospitals. The 
number of beds in the department's own infectious diseases institutions rose from 1,081 to 
2,340 over the same period. 
In the late-1930s, Hertzog's government resisted pressure from the Purified Nationalists and 
the Labour Party to create a national health insurance scheme for whites. It was not until 
1942, as part of the ongoing planning for the post-war era, that Prime Minister Smuts 
appointed the National Health Services Commission under the subsequent Minister of 
Health, Henry Gluckrnan. [57] Marks shows the role of the Native Affairs and Public Health 
Departments in this process. The NAD was calling for a rural health scheme from the late 
1930s: the Chamber of Mines had considered (though not provided) financial aid to improve 
migrant labourers' health at source. [58] The Smit Committee of 1942 which included 
prominent members of the Native Affairs and Public Health Departments, recommended 
increasing the subsidy for health visitors and district nurses and introducing compulsory child 
welfare and maternity schemes. [59] 
Officials in the Public Health Department were divided on their commitment to a 
comprehensive health care system. [60] George Gale's appointment in 1938 added an 
important voice to those calling internally for preventive care clinics. [61] On the other 
hand, the department had long been concerned about the cost of such a scheme and did not 
open its first clinic, at Polela in Natal, until the provincial authorities threatened to close their 
African hospitals for lack of funds. Marks argues that the department feared for its own 
position in the early 1940s in the face of calls from the medical profession for a national 
health service. The department finally dropped its opposition and George Gale guided 
Gluckman in drawing up the report, published in 1944. But the Smuts government rejected 
its report's proposals for a national health scheme as too expensive. [62] The one positive 
outcome, the establishment of another fifty health centres over five years, withered away in 
the 1950s as the National Party government sought alternative solutions to improving 
Afrikaner health. 
Of course, it is quite possible that, even without the extra administrative difficulties involved, 
neither the Public Health Department nor the central state as a whole possessed the will to 
develop a basic health care system for Africans. When the need had become too obvious to 
disguise in the later 1930s, officials had pretended that the change was due to the increased 
African regard for western medicine and not to widespread poverty and disease. [63] It was 
only in the 1940s - with the publication of the Smit Committee Report, the SEPC Reports, 
the Van Eck Commission, and, most importantly, the Gluckman Report - that the State was 
forced to admit the need for change. Senior personnel in the Public Health Department had 
long supported the government in its unwillingness to press local authorities beyond the 
barest minimum requirements - namely, in its attitude that public health was about preventing 
white people catching diseases from blacks and in its fear of heavy demands on the public 
purse or adverse effects on the medical profession. On the other hand, certain officials, such 
as Park Ross (at Durban), Allan, Gear and Gale had tried hard to improve public health 
within their limited powers and resources. The degree of autonomy they were allowed by the 
government, the lack of consensus within the department, and the effects of severe financial 
constraints and white public opinion in general, are reflected in their limited achievements 
before 1948. 
iv) Conclusion 
The entire field of health and welfare in South Africa has been neglected by social historians. 
This is all the more surprising given the great impact of disease and undernourishment from 
the late nineteenth century and the consequent increasing dependence on medicine, poor 
relief and other forms of welfare provision. [64] 
For analyses of the state, too, this area is highly significant. The manner in which successive 
governments organized subsidized housing, "outdoor relief' and medical services speaks 
volumes about what they regarded as the state's basic priorities. The underlying structures 
existed already by the early 1920s, and yet it was only with the pressures of the 1930s and 
1940s, coupled with shifts in the public debate about what the role of the state should be, that 
they were expanded beyond the bare minimum. Even then, the Smuts government used the 
apparatus of committees and commissions to appear more committed to social welfare than it 
actually was. In the meantime, the government was dedicated to winning the war before 
introducing any full-scale revisions. 
It remains to be explained why the state was so unwilling to accept responsibility for health 
and welfare. The chief factor here was cost. White voters were afraid of disease among 
Africans but would not have welcomed substantial tax increases for black social services. As 
the Chamber of Mines showed in its protests against unemployment insurance, the mines 
were strongly opposed to social policies which interfered with low-wage migrant labour or 
with profits. In parliament, the Nationalists attacked the government for wasting taxpayers' 
money on Africans and thereby encouraging the black influx to the towns. [65] More 
specifically, Dr K Bremer, a leading National Party health spokesman, argued that South 
Africa could not afford public health for the entire African population until Africans 
"contributed to the national economy". [66] Once the need for wartime propaganda passed 
and political parties began to focus their attention on the first peacetime general election, the 
government judged the time unpropitious for heavy spending on the disenfranchised 
majority. 
The SEPC and the Social Security and National Health Services Commissions had planned 
without detailed attention to cost constraints. The SEPC, for example, recommended 
increasing social security and health spending by over 200 per cent (from E17.5m, to £52m). 
The Parliamentary Select Committee endorsed the spirit of the SEPC Report but called for 
drastic cuts to the original plan, with spending of E32.5m. [67] The Gluckman Report put the 
cost of a national health scheme (for the central government) at E12m with further 
expenditure by provincial and local authorities. [68] In Parliament, the government accepted 
the report in principle but stressed that it could not be implemented overnight. It made 
Gluckrnan Minister of Health, created an Advisory Committee and a Co-ordinating Council 
and built relatively inexpensive health centres. The government did not envisage expenditure 
on the scale proposed in the Gluckrnan Report. Provincial administrations, which controlled 
general hospitals, also strongly opposed a rapid, costly expansion in their facilities and the 
government rejected coercion. [69] As a result, legislation passed from 1945-48 on 
unemployment insurance, pensions, housing and health care, fell short of the high 
expectations of wartime planners. 
During World War 11, the state appropriated the concepts of public health and social welfare 
to buttress its power at a difficult time. The councils and commissions of the 1940s helped to 
show how in step the Union was with its allies, a world player in domestic as well as foreign 
policy. It further allowed the government to appear to be providing a forum for the 
expression of different views while in fact coming down heavily in favour of a narrow vision 
of the "Welfare State". Meanwhile, the line purveyed in speeches, press releases and official 
publications always emphasised the state's commitment to developing better welfare 
provisions. 
The study of health and welfare provides us with valuable evidence of how the central State 
interacted with other authorities at the provincial and local levels as well as in the business 
world and how it operated within its own entanglement of laws and departments. This was 
critical in health care, with its overlapping jurisdictions. It was also important in such areas 
as unemployment insurance where the NAD's function in administering to Africans gave it a 
right to comment on amendments but where the primary responsibility for drafting legislation 
lay with another department. 
By 1948, the South African state was as aware of the impoverishment and miserable living 
conditions of the African working class as it was of the need to enhance what David Harvey 
has called "the happiness, docility and efficiency of labor". [70] The state was alive to the 
need for social stability and the possibilities of legitimating itself to diverse groups by 
extending its participation in health and welfare provision. This had to be balanced against 
the danger of going too far - of demanding too much from the white taxpayer or of leaving 
itself open to the charge of negating the "work ethic", by which workers were assumed to 
have a fundamental duty to provide for themselves and their families. The state bureaucracy 
played an important role in resolving these two components, sometimes acting in the interests 
of Africans and ahead of white public opinion, at other times creating the appearance of 
government action while in reality changing very little. Civil servants across Native Affairs, 
Labour, Public Health and Social Welfare both influenced and were constrained by the 
political process. They perceived the long-term benefits of developing health and social 
security but operated under governments tied to more immediate, short-term political 
interests. 
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